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he financial services industry has experienced significant 
changes over the past two decades. Hundreds of banks 
have been consolidated, restructured, or newly formed. In 
addition, deregulation of where banks can operate and what 
they can do has encouraged both geographic and product 
diversification. The most recent aspect of this transformation 
trend is the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB) Act, 
which loosens restrictions on banks’ abilities to engage in the 
previously restricted activity of underwriting securities and 
permits banks to underwrite insurance policies. 
This paper examines some of the potential consequences of 
GLB for the structure of the U.S. financial services industry. In 
it, we ask how the industry may evolve as this new legislation 
interacts with the consolidation trend already under way, what 
types of mergers are most likely to occur, and how profitable 
and risky the resulting firms might be.
We begin by reviewing the consolidation trend that has 
occurred within the U.S. banking industry over the past ten 
years. We explore reasons for the trend, focusing on the factors 
responsible for the recent pick-up in its pace. Consolidation 
accelerated following the 1980s deregulation of restrictions that 
prohibited bank expansion across geographic markets and into 
other financial services. If history is any guide, we ought to see 
further consolidation following the passage of GLB. Stock price 
reaction to its passage suggests that market participants also 
anticipate more financial consolidation, especially in the life 
insurance business.
We then test whether better diversification post-GLB can 
improve the risk-return trade-off faced by financial companies. 
We do so by constructing hypothetical, pro-forma mergers 
between bank holding companies (BHCs) and firms in each of 
the other three major financial services industries: life 
insurance, property and casualty insurance, and securities. The 
results suggest that, ceteris paribus, mergers between BHCs and 
life insurance firms will produce firms that are less risky (and 
no less profitable) than those in either of the two individual 
industries. Mergers between BHCs and either securities firms 
or property and casualty firms raise BHCs’ risk measures only 
slightly. Similar to the analysis of stock returns, these results 
point most strongly to combinations of banks and life 
insurance companies.
As a final step, we review how the financial services industry 
has evolved in Europe. A European bank’s ability to expand 
into other financial activities, unlike that of a U.S. bank, is 
relatively unrestricted. In recent years, these banks have made 
significant inroads in the life insurance industry. By examining 
these advances, we can better understand the role of scope 
economies in the banking industry’s evolution, something we 
cannot infer from the pro-forma data analysis.
Overall, our findings point to continued consolidation 
among financial firms. The consolidation trend within the 
banking industry will likely continue as banks respond further 
to the elimination of prior restrictions. Moreover, the recent 
elimination of barriers preventing banks from engaging fully in 
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securities underwriting and insurance will allow them to take 
advantage of both diversification and economy-of-scope 
benefits as they expand into these industries.
Recent Consolidation Trends 
in a Decade of Change 
Several hundred bank mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have 
occurred each year over the past two decades. However, during 
the past decade, megamergers—M&As between institutions 
with assets of more than $1 billion each—have occurred much 
more frequently. Most recently, M&As in the United States and 
elsewhere have increased dramatically in size; such activity 
between institutions with assets in excess of $100 billion has 
become almost commonplace. Based on market value, nine of 
the ten largest M&As in U.S. history were announced during 
1998, and four of these—Citicorp-Travelers, BankAmerica-
NationsBank, Banc One-First Chicago, and Norwest-Wells 
Fargo—occurred in banking (Moore and Siems 1998). In 1999, 
the pace of these megamergers slowed considerably (not one 
was announced in the United States), perhaps because market 
participants were waiting for resolution of the debate on 
financial services modernization.
As a result of the rapid M&A activity, the number of banks 
and banking organizations (stand-alone banks and top-tier 
bank holding companies) each fell by about 40 percent between 
1989 and 1999 (Table 1). The share of total nationwide assets 
held by the eight largest banking organizations nearly doubled 
over this period, rising from 21.3 percent to 41.5 percent.1 At 
the same time that large banks’ market share was increasing, 
the market shares and profitability of very small and small 
banking organizations—defined as having total assets of less 
than $50 million and between $50 million and $300 million, 
respectively—fell sharply. As Table 1 indicates, over the 1989-
99 period, the share of domestic assets held by small banking 
organizations fell from 12.3 percent to 9.0 percent, while the 
share of assets held by very small banking organizations 
dropped from 3.3 percent to 1.6 percent. The decline in market 
share may have occurred because small banks’ profits relative 
to those of their larger competitors declined. Before 1992, for 
example, the largest 100 banks (ranked by assets) consistently 
earned lower returns per dollar of equity than banks outside 
the top 100. After 1992, the largest 100 banks consistently 
outperformed smaller banks (Bomfim and Nelson 1999).2 
Similarly, after 1992, banks ranked between the 100th and 
Table 1 
Concentration, Ownership, and Number of Firms in the Commercial Banking Industry
Asset Share (Percent)
Year
Number of U.S. Bank 
Charters
Number of Banking 
Organizations
Number of Offices 
in Banks Plus Thrifts
Eight Largest Banking 
Organizations




1989 12,728 9,620 84,388 21.3 3.3 12.3
1990 12,370 9,391 84,375 21.3 3.3 12.5
1991 11,950 9,167 83,484 23.7 3.2 12.8
1992 11,495 8,871 81,204 23.6 3.1 12.9
1993 11,001 8,445 80,758 24.8 2.8 12.4
1994 10,488 8,017 81,677 26.3 2.6 11.6
1995 9,983 7,680 81,900 30.0 2.3 11.1
1996 9,576 7,415 83,052 31.3 2.1 10.7
1997 9,216 7,225 84,291 35.2 1.8 10.0
1998 8,846 6,943 85,190 35.0 1.6 9.1
1999 8,698 6,852 86,527 41.5 1.6 9.0
Sources: Reports of Condition and Income; National Information Center (1989-99); FDIC Historical Statistics on Banking. 
Notes: A banking organization is a top-tier bank holding company or a stand-alone bank. The figures for 1999 are as of the second quarter; all other figures 
are as of year-end. A very small banking organization is one with total banking assets of less than $50 million in 1997 dollars; a small banking organization is 
one with assets between $50 million and $300 million in 1997 dollars.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / October 2000 41
1,000th largest consistently outperformed banks outside the 
largest 1,000.
One can point to four key factors that contributed to the fast 
pace of M&A activity. First, profitability and high stock prices 
in banking during the mid-to-late 1990s may have relaxed 
financing constraints on this activity. Second, banks have been 
losing market share to competing financial institutions on both 
sides of the balance sheet since the end of the 1970s. 
Consolidation provides an efficient way to eliminate the excess 
capacity that has arisen in response to the emergence of 
nonbank financial institutions. Third, sophisticated financial 
technologies such as derivatives contracts, off-balance-sheet 
guarantees, and risk management may be more efficiently 
produced by larger institutions. Finally, the deregulation of 
restrictions on banks’ ability to expand geographically was 
relaxed in the 1980s and early 1990s. With a series of removals 
of restrictions on intrastate and interstate banking, concluding 
with the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act of 1994, interstate branching was permitted in 
almost all states.3 The removal of these constraints allowed 
some previously prohibited M&As to occur.4
Expansion of Bank Powers Prior 
to Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Regulatory restrictions in the United States had prohibited 
bank involvement in underwriting, insurance, and other 
“nonbank” activities since the Banking Act of 1933, sections of 
which became known collectively as the Glass-Steagall Act.5 
Subsequent measures in 1956 and 1970 strengthened the 
demarcation between banks, insurance companies, and 
securities firms. BHCs were allowed to underwrite certain 
eligible securities, including general obligation bonds, U.S. 
government bonds, and real estate bonds, which were 
exempted from the original Act. But it was not until the mid-
1980s that the Federal Reserve and the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) began loosening 
restrictions on greater bank participation in investment 
banking and in insurance. (See Table 2 for an historical 
summary of recent deregulatory efforts.) 
The Federal Reserve began the deregulatory push for BHC 
activity in securities with a decision in 1987 to allow subsidiaries 
of a small group of holding companies to underwrite certain 
previously prohibited securities—such as municipal revenue 
bonds, commercial paper, and mortgage-related securities—
on a limited basis. The Federal Reserve derived legal authority 
for the decision from a clause in Section 20 of the 1933 Banking 
Act that prohibits banks from affiliating with a company 
“engaged principally” in underwriting or dealing securities. 
The Federal Reserve contended that the “engaged principally” 
clause allowed BHC subsidiaries to underwrite these “ineligible 
securities” as long as the revenue from such underwritings did 
not exceed 5 percent of the subsidiary’s gross revenue. 
In January 1989, the Federal Reserve also allowed the 
“Section 20 subsidiaries” to underwrite corporate debt and 
equity securities contingent on the 5 percent revenue 
limitation. The Federal Reserve continued its incremental 
lifting of restrictions by increasing the revenue limit on 
Table 2 
Summary of Important Dates Prior to the Passage 
of Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Date Description
April 30, 1987 Federal Reserve authorizes limited underwriting 
activity for Bankers Trust, J. P. Morgan, and 
Citicorp, with a 5 percent revenue limit on 
Section 20 ineligible securities activities.
January 18, 1989 Federal Reserve expands Section 20 underwriting 
permissibility to corporate debt and equity 
securities, subject to revenue limit. 
September 13, 1989 Federal Reserve raises limit on revenue from 
Section 20 ineligible securities activities from 
5 percent to 10 percent.
July 16, 1993 Court ruling in Independent Insurance Agents 
of America v. Ludwig allows national banks to sell 
insurance from small towns.
January 18, 1995 Court ruling in Nationsbank v. Valic allows banks 
to sell annuities.
March 26, 1996 Court ruling in Barnett Bank v. Nelson overturns 
states’ restrictions on banks’ insurance sales.
October 30, 1996 Federal Reserve announces the elimination 
of many firewalls between bank and nonbank 
subsidiaries within bank holding companies 
(BHCs).
December 20, 1996 Federal Reserve raises limit on revenue from 
Section 20 ineligible securities activities from 
10 percent to 25 percent. 
August 22, 1997 Federal Reserve eliminates many of the remaining 
firewalls between bank and nonbank subsidiar-
ies within BHCs.
April 6, 1998 Citicorp and Travelers Group announce merger 
initiating a new round of debate on financial 
reform.
Sources: Mester (1996); Bhargava and Fraser (1998); Boyd and Graham 
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Chart 1
Section 20 Subsidiaries of Bank Holding 
Companies: Share of the Securities Industry
Percent
Sources: Securities Industry Factbook (1999); Federal Reserve 
Y-20 reports.
Notes: The numerator represents the total revenue and underwriting 
revenue reported by Section 20 subsidiaries. The denominator 
represents the total revenue and underwriting revenue of the 
securities industry. The denominator is calculated from annual 
revenue data of New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) member securities 
firms, and then expanded by dividing by the percentage of total 
industry revenue held by NYSE members. These firms represent on 
average 68 percent of the total industry over the sample period. We 
assume that the NYSE member firms’ percentage of underwriting 
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Chart 2
Annuity Sales by Banks
Billions of dollars
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on Reports of Condition 
and Income.
Note: Annuity sales were not reported prior to 1995.






Section 20 subsidiaries to 10 percent in September 1989 and to 
25 percent in December 1996. Also in 1996, the Federal Reserve 
began contemplating the elimination of previously instituted 
“firewalls” between bank and nonbank activity within the 
subsidiary structure of a BHC. The firewalls had been instituted 
originally to insulate bank subsidiaries from more risky 
nonbank subsidiaries.6 In 1997, the majority of the barriers 
were removed.
While the Federal Reserve oversaw BHC expansion into 
securities, OCC rulings backed by the federal courts loosened 
restrictions on national banks’ insurance activity. Prior to 
1986, state insurance regulators imposed limitations on 
national banks’ insurance sales and underwriting. That year, 
the OCC argued that a previously overlooked section of the 
1917 National Bank Act (Section 92) allowed a national bank to 
sell insurance anywhere under the condition that one of its 
branches be located in a town with less than 5,000 people. In 
1993, a U.S. Court of Appeals ruling upheld the OCC decision. 
State regulators continued fighting the Court decision until a 
1996 U.S. Supreme Court ruling upheld it. The decision forced 
state legislatures to level the playing field by passing new laws 
allowing both national and state-chartered banks to sell 
insurance through subsidiaries or directly through bank 
branches. National banks won another victory in an unrelated 
1995 U.S. Supreme Court decision, when the Court ruled that 
state law could not prohibit the sale of annuities by national 
banks. The Court maintained that both fixed and variable 
annuities were analogous to activities of savings banks and 
therefore were not subject to the state’s jurisdiction over 
insurance. 
As the regulations were modified, banks began a notable 
expansion into nonbank financial products. BHCs, through 
their Section 20 subsidiaries, began to capture a significant 
portion of the securities market. In fact, BHCs increased their 
share of the securities industry’s total revenue from 9 percent 
to more than 25 percent in just six years (Chart 1). Section 20 
subsidiaries also made significant inroads in underwriting, 
especially after the 1996 loosening of the “ineligible” under-
writing revenue restriction. Bank annuity sales also increased 
rapidly (Chart 2), and evidence from a study by the Association 
of Banks-In-Insurance (ABI) suggests that banks accounted 
for approximately 15 percent of the total annuities sales 
nationwide (Table 3). This same study indicates that banks still 
represent a small portion of insurance sales, however, it also 
suggests that an increasing number of banks will begin 
marketing insurance products over the next two years. 
Despite increasing revenue for BHCs in nonbank financial 
products, the regulatory environment prior to GLB continued 
to impose limitations on expansion across financial sectors. 
The passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act therefore was a 
major event in the deregulatory process, removing almost 
entirely the remaining barriers separating banks, securities 
firms, and insurance companies.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / October 2000 43
Market Reaction to the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act 
On October 22, 1999, President Clinton announced that his 
administration had reached a compromise with Congress on 
GLB that guaranteed its eventual passage. The legislation allows 
the formation of financial holding companies under which 
subsidiaries can engage in insurance, securities, and banking 
activities.7 Although the long-term implications of GLB still are 
unclear, the response of financial sector stock prices on 
October 22 suggests that shareholders took a positive view 
toward a continuation of BHC expansion into nonbank 
financial products and financial consolidation in general. As 
Table 4 shows, among the most notable performers were “top 
financial advisors,” defined as companies—either securities 
firms or BHC subsidiaries—with strong M&A advisory records 
in the financial sector. Their performance suggests a 
widespread expectation that future financial consolidation will 
generate fee-based revenue for top financial advisors. BHCs 
with Section 20 subsidiaries also experienced significant excess 
returns; shareholders appeared to favor BHCs that had begun 
exploring the broadened opportunities in securities 
underwriting prior to the passage of GLB.
Insurance company shareholders also reacted favorably to 
the compromise. In particular, the response of the share prices 
Table 3 



















    Variable 28.3 15.2 8.6 52.1 ~15
    Fixed 28.3 14.5 8.8 51.6
Life insurance <1
    Term 27.8 20.7 11.8 60.3
    Whole 23.1 21.4 11.3 55.8
    Universal 21.1 21.1 11.5 53.7
    Variable 17.4 21.1 11.1 49.6
Personal property 
  and casualty
<2
    Homeowners 18.7 21.9 12.0 52.6
    Auto 17.7 21.9 12.0 51.6
Commercial 
  property and casualty 16.7 19.4 9.6 45.7 <2













Sample 558 0.021 0.007
Top financial advisorsb 12 0.079 0.065
Bank holding companies 290 0.011 -0.003
   With Section 20 subsidiariesc 25 0.033 0.019
   Top financial advisors 5 0.049 0.035
   Top twenty by assets 20 0.037 0.023
Securities companies 76 0.048 0.034
   Top financial advisors 7 0.100 0.086
   Top twenty by assets 20 0.090 0.076
Insurance companiesd 156 0.029 0.015
   Health 27 0.008 -0.006
   Life 26 0.063 0.049
   Property and casualty 74 0.027 0.013
   Top twenty by assets 20 0.068 0.054
Insurance brokers/agents 36 0.019 0.005
Memo:
Market return measurements
   Dow Industrials 0.017
   S&P 500 Index 0.014
   S&P Bank Index 0.041
Sources: Sample and structural data are from Standard and Poor’s
Compustat database for the end of 1998; stock return information for 
October 22, 1999, is from Bloomberg Financial Services.
Notes: Asset rankings are based on total assets as reported by 
Compustat at the end of 1998.  All companies included in the rankings 
are publicly traded with significant equity in the U.S. markets.
aExcess return is the single-day return less the S&P 500 Index return. 
bA top financial advisor is a bank holding company (BHC) or securities 
firm that is one of the top fifty companies based on the total deal value of 
advised mergers in the financial sector in 1998 (see American Banker, 
February 2, 1999, p. 18A).
cBHCs with Section 20 subsidiaries are those with subsidiaries that 
underwrite ineligible securities.
dHealth insurance companies are defined as those companies with a 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code of 6321 (Accident and 
Health Insurance) or 6324 (Hospital and Medical Service Plans). Life 
insurance companies include those companies with a SIC code of 6311. 
Property and casualty insurance companies have a SIC code of 6331 and 
brokers/agents have a two-digit SIC code of 64.44 The Changing Landscape of the Financial Services Industry
of life insurance firms—a single-day average excess return of 
4.9 percent—suggests that investors believe that life insurance 
firms are among those companies that have the most to gain 
from the legislation. Shareholders may believe that life 
insurance companies can be more profitable if they offer both 
bank and insurance products. In addition, they may perceive 
certain life insurance companies to be attractive candidates for 
mergers with BHCs that want to expand their available 
insurance operations. The shareholder response to the 
announced compromise on GLB might reflect a confirmation 
of the past expansion by BHCs into nonbank financial 
products; it might also reflect optimism for the new 
opportunities owing to consolidation across the banking and 
life insurance sectors.
Consequences of Financial 
Consolidation 
It is interesting to know that stock market participants reacted 
favorably to the passage of GLB, but without further research 
we can only hypothesize as to why they reacted this way. For 
example, did the positive reaction occur because mergers 
between BHCs and other types of financial firms will create 
more profitable firms? Are there synergies between firms that 
can be taken advantage of? Will these firms have a smaller risk 
of bankruptcy? 
To varying degrees, prior research has examined these 
questions. Only limited research has been conducted on the 
efficiency gains of combining commercial banks and other 
types of financial service firms, because little data have been 
available to examine this issue. However, one study of the cost-
scope efficiency of German universal banks found mostly 
diseconomies associated with producing loans and investment-
oriented services within the same institution (Lang and Welzel 
1998). More research has evaluated the risk-reduction 
potential of combining banking and nontraditional financial 
activities.8 Kwast (1989) analyzed the correlation between 
banks’ eligible trading and nontrading assets and found that 
banks’ engagement in eligible securities activities offers limited 
potential for diversification gains. More recently, Kwan (1998) 
found that combining a Section 20 subsidiary with a bank 
subsidiary can improve a BHC’s risk-return trade-off.9
Taking a somewhat different approach, Boyd and Graham 
(1988) explored the risk-reduction potential of merging BHCs 
with other financial firms by simulating cross-industry 
mergers. Using U.S. data from the 1970s and 1980s, the authors 
considered whether diversification benefits from these mergers 
were significant enough to lower the riskiness of the resulting 
firm. They concluded that mergers between BHCs and life 
insurance firms would likely decrease BHC bankruptcy risk, 
while mergers with all other types of financial firms would 
likely increase this risk.10 We are not aware of any work that has 
considered whether the results reported by Boyd and Graham 
are robust across time periods, and in particular robust to the 
last decade. Hence, the goal of our study is to fill this void.11
Using data from the 1984-98 period, we present the risk-
return characteristics for all of the major financial services 
industries: bank holding company, securities, property and 
casualty insurance, life insurance, insurance agent/broker, 
investment advice, real estate development, and other real 
estate firms. We then compute these same statistics for 
simulated mergers over the 1990s between BHCs and firms 
from a subset of the remaining financial services industries: 
securities, property and casualty, and life insurance. The idea 
behind examining this subset of industries is to focus on the 
most likely cross-industry mergers with firms large enough to 
affect a BHC’s risk-return profile. We use data from the 1990s 
because the number of bank mergers throughout the period 
makes it difficult to have consistent data over the entire period. 
In addition, the recent data are more likely to be insightful 
about future mergers.
As with the earlier simulation studies, there are, of course, 
caveats to this analysis. Economies of scale or scope cannot be 
taken into account, for example. Nor can we account for the 
fact that we do not have a crystal ball: we cannot focus on 
mergers that are actually going to occur. Nevertheless, we think 
our results provide an upper bound on what is likely to happen, 
since taking into account particular synergies between firms 
should serve to improve on the risk calculations that we do 
report.
Data and Methodology
We begin by examining annual year-end balance-sheet data on 
all publicly traded financial firms in Standard and Poor’s 
Compustat database over the 1984-98 period. The industries 
we examine and the number of firms within each industry are 
reported in Table 5, along with statistics on firm size in each 
industry. As we can see from the table, with the exception of the 
“other real estate” category, we have a meaningful number of 
firms in each industry to use for our calculations. 
We calculate one measure of profitability and two measures 
of risk for each firm and report the median value for each 
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hypothetically merged firms. In order to compute meaningful 
statistics, we require that firms in the sample report at least five 
years of data. Thus, we include firms that may have failed 
during the period as long as they meet this criterion. The 
measure of profitability we calculate is the rate of return on 
average accounting equity,  :
,
where   is net income after taxes,   is total equity, and t 
denotes the year. Hence, average equity is the average of year-
end equity in years t-1 and t. Profits are a flow, earned over 
year t.
The first measure of risk we report is the standard deviation 
on the rate of return on equity,  : 
,
where   is the mean of the   and   is the number of periods 
in which the firm is in the sample. The standard deviation 
allows us to consider whether there are diversification benefits 
from mergers, which reduce the volatility of the rates of return. 
The second measure of risk we report is the Z-score, an 
indicator of the probability of bankruptcy. The Z-score begins 
with the idea that bankruptcy arises when profits are 
sufficiently negative to eliminate equity. The Z-score (or Z), 
then, is the number of standard deviations below the mean by 
which profits must fall to bankrupt the firm. Z is defined as:
R
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where   is total assets in period t and   is the 
return on assets in year t.   is the estimated standard deviation 
of the return on assets. As the formula indicates, the higher the 
mean rate of return on assets and the higher the ratio of equity 
to assets, the higher Z is. Hence, higher values of Z are 
associated with lower probabilities of failure. The more volatile 
the asset returns, the lower the Z-score. Thus, calculating this 
measure allows us to consider whether any increase in the 
volatility of returns resulting from a BHC merging with 
another firm is offset by increases in the level of returns, 
producing a lower risk of bankruptcy. Moreover, if returns are 
normally distributed, then Z can be mapped simply into the 
probability that a firm experiences insolvency over a one-year 
horizon.12 
To consider how BHC risk and return would be affected 
by BHCs merging with other financial firms, we construct 
pro-forma mergers between the ten largest BHCs and the ten 
largest firms in each of the other three financial services 
industries. Using all of the combinations, we create 100 
mergers for each of the three cross-industry combinations, and 
we report the results for the median firm.
Results 
We first present the profitability and risk statistics for each of 
the industries in Table 6 in order to obtain a sense of the 
industries’ relative standings. As the first column of the top 
panel indicates, investment advice firms were the most 
profitable over the 1984-98 period, followed by bank holding 
companies and securities firms. Insurance companies follow, 
while the least profitable firms were those engaged in real 
estate. Both measures of risk rank the industries in roughly the 
same order. BHCs are the least risky, followed by life insurance 
and property and casualty insurance firms. Securities and 
investment advice are in the middle of the group, and real 
estate firms are the most risky. Given the highly regulated 
nature of the banking industry, it perhaps makes sense that this 
industry proves to have the lowest risk among the group. 
Regulators often encourage mergers when a banking firm is 
weak and hence there is likely less recorded evidence of firms 
close to failure than would otherwise appear in the data. Life 
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Table 5
Number and Size of Sample Financial Firms, 
1984-98
Assets (Millions of Dollars)
Industry Category
 Number
of Firms Median Smallest Largest Mean
Bank holding company 462 2,169 1.00 617,679 10,175
Securities 57 261 0.45 317,590 14,421
Life insurance 48 2,463 6.42 105,107 7,320
Property and casualty 
   insurance 101 1,243 0.15 194,398 7,159
Insurance agent/
   broker 45 54 0.31 19,736 821
Real estate 
   development 23 26 0.18 1,151 80
Other real estate 9 37 2.34 800 85
Investment advice 26 98 0.33 3,480 324
Source: Standard and Poor’s Compustat Services, Inc.46 The Changing Landscape of the Financial Services Industry
insurance and property and casualty insurance are also fairly 
highly regulated, and this factor could account for their 
relatively low risk ranking as well.
As a check on the robustness of our results, we also compute 
these same statistics over the 1992-98 period. This subsample 
exploration allows us to consider whether the results vary when 
the 1980s and the early 1990s are excluded, a period in which 
many firms were in poor financial health. As the second 
column of Table 6 shows, there are a few differences in relative 
industry profitability, with securities firms and insurance 
agent/broker firms somewhat more profitable in the 1990s. 
However, there are virtually no differences in the relative risk 
rankings in the 1990s compared with the entire period. The 
overall level of risk is lower when the 1980s are excluded, a 
result consistent with the idea that these firms were in weaker 
financial health over the early part of the sample. 
Our findings also accord well with those originally reported 
by Boyd and Graham (1988). The last column of Table 6 
reproduces their statistics, indicating that the relative 
profitability and risk rankings over the 1970-84 period are very 
similar to our findings. Two points are worth noting in 
comparison. First, as they were in the 1990s, insurance agent/
broker firms were quite profitable in the 1970s. Thus, this 
industry’s performance in the 1980s appears to be the outlier to 
an otherwise profitable performance record. Second, the level 
of risk recorded over the 1970-84 period is closer to the levels 
experienced in the 1990s, suggesting that the late 1980s were 
clearly a difficult period for many financial services firms.
Mergers
The risk measures from combining a BHC with another 
financial firm cannot be gleaned merely from the two firms’ 
standard deviations; the calculation also depends on the 
covariance of returns. Hence, to obtain the statistics for 
combined firms, we merge the balance-sheet data and calculate 
the risk-return statistics for the pro-forma merged firm. As we 
noted, we conduct mergers between BHCs and firms in the life 
insurance, property and casualty insurance, and securities 
industries. To prevent the outcome from being determined by 
the larger firm’s size, we examine mergers between the ten 
largest BHCs and the ten largest firms in each of the other 
industries. The size characteristics of the firms used in the 
mergers are reported in Table 7.13 
The risk-return measures for the pro-forma mergers with 
the ten largest BHCs are presented in Table 8. As we can see, 
mergers between BHCs and life insurance firms lower the risk 
of both firms. The top ten BHCs have a median standard 
deviation of 0.0212, while that of the life insurance firms is 
0.0220. The median of the merged firms is 0.0176. Thus, there 
are clearly diversification benefits to BHC-life insurance 
mergers. The Z-score also rises with these mergers, indicating 
that the barely lower profitability (16.26 profitability for the 
merged firms, compared with 16.77 for the BHCs) is offset by 
the benefits of the lower risk.
Table 6
Profitability and Risk Measures by Industry
Profitability
Median   (Percent)
Industry Category 1984-98 1992-98 1971-84a
Bank holding
  company 12.98 13.28 13.12
Securities 12.98 16.45 16.52
Life insurance 10.58 11.23 12.82
Property and
  casualty insurance 11.17 11.73 13.44
Insurance agent/
  broker 7.80 14.75 19.98
Real estate
  development 2.29 8.94 10.03
Other real estate 2.82 5.12 0.65
Investment




Industry Category SZ SZ SZ
Bank holding
  company 0.0271 33.87 0.0173 53.93 0.0245 43.36
Securities 0.1049 10.44 0.0781 14.50 0.0909 13.33
Life insurance 0.0453 19.09 0.0245 31.58 0.0261 36.79
Property and
  casualty insurance 0.0691 14.82 0.0449 20.04 0.0467 24.56
Insurance agent/
  broker 0.1468 8.49 0.0699 13.56 0.0554 15.97
Real estate
  development 0.2892 3.47 0.1408 7.36 0.1382 8.66
Other real estate 0.3642 2.31 0.3899 2.14 0.0925 12.98
Investment
  adviceb 0.1655 9.48 0.1106 11.37
Sources: Standard and Poor’s Compustat Services, Inc.; authors’
calculations.
aThe 1971-84 period reflects the results from Boyd and Graham (1988).
bIn Boyd and Graham (1988), the “investment advice” category is 
included in the “securities” category.
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Mergers with securities firms and property and casualty 
firms barely change BHC risk, from 0.0212 to 0.0222 and to 
0.0221, respectively, although the probability of bankruptcy as 
indicated by the Z-score is higher (a lower Z )f o r m er g e rs  w i t h  
property and casualty firms. The lower relative rate of return 
recorded by property and casualty firms serves to lower Z when 
these firms merge with BHCs.14 These findings clearly suggest 
that mergers between BHCs and life insurance companies are 
likely to produce firms with less risk than either of the two 
separate entities, while mergers with securities and property 
and casualty firms will raise BHC probability of bankruptcy 
modestly. The latter findings stand in contrast to those 
reported by Boyd and Graham (1988). Their simulated 
mergers created firms with lower Zs, and higher standard 
deviations, leading the authors to recommend against mergers 
between BHCs and either securities firms or property and 
casualty firms.
Our contrasting findings likely result from the fact that we 
examined mergers between the largest firms in each industry 
while the earlier study examined random mergers. Random 
mergers almost surely generated some combinations of a large 
securities or property and casualty firm and a small bank 
holding company, such that the former, typically riskier, firm 
received the bulk of the weight in the calculations. The different 
time period could also play a role because, generally speaking, 
financial firms were in better shape in the 1990s than they were 
in the 1980s.15
Lessons from Europe
Recent data on M&A activity in Europe provide further insight 
into how the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act might influence 
consolidation. Europe provides a good model for comparison 
because most European countries permit banking, securities, 
and insurance activities to occur in the same company or 
Table 7
Number and Size of Sample Financial Firms,
1992-98
Assets (Millions of Dollars)
Industry Category Median Smallest Largest Mean
Top ten bank holding
  companies 147,522 40,776 617,679 171,706
Top ten securities firms 92,085 2,111 317,590 103,269
Top ten life insurance
  companies 21,805 5,067 105,107 29,744
Top ten property and
  casualty companies 41,912 13,252 194,398 54,915
Source: Standard and Poor’s Compustat Services, Inc.
Table 8
Profitability and Risk Measures if a BHC Had Merged with a Nonbank Financial Firm
Profitability (Percent) Risk
Median B&G Mediana Median B&G Mediana
Industry Category SZ S Z
Top ten BHCs 16.77 13.12 0.0212 52.08 0.0245 43.36
BHCs-securities firms 16.90 14.06 0.0222 48.41 0.0480 24.93
BHCs-life insurance companies 16.26 12.95 0.0176 56.83 0.0201 49.30
BHCs-property and casualty companies 15.17 12.97 0.0221 41.18 0.0432 25.28
Top ten securities firms 18.48 16.52 0.0471 17.57 0.0909 13.33
Top ten life insurance companies 13.29 12.82 0.0220 36.66 0.0261 36.79
Top ten property and casualty companies 11.84 13.44 0.0304 24.34 0.0467 24.56
Sources: Standard and Poor’s Compustat Services, Inc.; authors’ calculations.
Notes: Each hypothetical industry includes 100 firms created by merging each top ten bank holding company (BHC) with each top ten nonbank financial 
firm from our 1992-98 sample of publicly traded firms. A top ten firm is defined as a firm ranking in the top ten of total assets within an industry, defined by 
the Standard Industrial Classification code, as of year-end 1996.
aThe column refers to Boyd and Graham’s (1988) profitability and risk measure results over the 1971-84 period.
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holding company. Table 9 reports the flows of M&A activity 
within the European Community (EC) and within the United 
States. The values shown are the sum of the market values of all 
target institutions over 1985-99, and the percentages of the 
European or U.S. activity these represent. 
As the table shows, over the past fifteen years, there was a 
little more than $775 billion in consolidation activity in 
Europe, of which 49 percent came from banks consolidating 
with other banks. Consolidation across sectors (the off-
diagonal elements) has also been fairly common in Europe, 
accounting for about 24 percent of M&A activity. By 
comparison, there was $873 billion in consolidation activity in 
the United States, of which 56 percent involved only banks. 
Consolidation across segments has been relatively uncommon 
in the United States, however, as a result of the restrictions on 
bank activities during most of the period. Only 3.7 percent of 
total M&A activity occurred between banks and securities firms 
and about 17 percent of all financial M&As occurred across 
segments.16 If the U.S. financial sector begins to evolve 
similarly to the European sector, we will likely see a substantial 
increase in M&A activity across the three main segments.
Since few legal barriers prevent European banks from 
entering the insurance business, many of these banks reacted 
to the intensified competitive environment of the 1980s and 
1990s by entering aggressively into insurance. In the process, 
they created a model of combined banking and insurance now 
called “bancassurance.” We review the bancassurance model 
here, since the European experience may suggest how the 
banking and insurance industries are likely to evolve in the 
United States post-GLB.17
Origins of Banks’ Interest 
in Insurance
In recent decades, banks abroad faced many of the same 
competitive pressures as banks in the United States. Traditional 
banking in most EC countries had not grown robustly, and 
profitability had fallen, prompting banks to explore new 
business opportunities.18 At the same time, the life insurance 
business was doing quite well. Between 1986 and 1991, life 
insurance premiums grew more than 10 percent per year in 
eight of the twelve EC countries, and growth exceeded 
12 percent per year on average across all countries (Hoschka 
1994). Moreover, growth in life insurance seemed likely to be 
sustained, since it could be traced to long-run phenomena such 
as rising income and wealth and a rising share of older people. 
Life insurance also looked attractive to banks because most EC 
countries promote it through advantageous tax provisions, in 
order to encourage individuals to provide for their retirement. 
As of 1994, tax deductibility for life insurance premiums was 
offered in nine of the twelve EC countries, while tax-free status 
for some or all of the proceeds of life insurance policies was 
offered in a different group of nine countries (Hoschka 1994).
Table 9
Values of the Targets of Financial Institutions’ M&A Activity, 1985-99














Commercial bank 377.4 33.2 49.4 460.0 489.2 6.7 73.5 569.4
(48.6) (4.3) (6.4) (59.2) (56.1) (0.8) (8.4) (65.3)
Securities firm 22.8 50.8 11.5 85.1 23.5 114.3 16.1 153.9
(2.9) (6.5) (1.5) (11.0) (2.7) (13.1) (1.8) (17.6)
Insurance company 40.2 33.0 159.0 232.2 0.6 31.2 117.4 149.2
(5.2) (4.2) (20.5) (29.9) (0.1) (3.6) (13.5) (17.1)
Total 440.4 116.9 219.9 777.3 513.3 152.2 207.0 872.5
(56.7) (15.0) (28.3) (100.0) (58.8) (17.4) (23.7) (100.0)
Source: Securities Data Company.
Note: Top figures are the sum of all target institutions’ market value of equity just before being acquired, in billions of dollars; figures in parentheses are the 
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Table 10 shows that combinations of banks and life 
insurance companies constituted more than 10 percent of the 
total M&A activity in financial services. By contrast, European 
banks and property and casualty insurance companies almost 
never combined. This may be explained by the fact that the 
average growth in property and casualty premiums over the 
same period, although an attractive 8 percent per year, was 
nevertheless slower than the growth in life insurance 
premiums.
In short, at the same time that banks in Europe were pushed 
to consider additional sources of revenue by competition in 
their traditional product lines, they were pulled toward life 
insurance by the industry’s sustained rapid growth and tax-
advantaged status. In addition, banks were, and still are, drawn 
to life insurance because of substantial cost advantages. We 
briefly discuss each advantage, drawing heavily on a joint study 
published in 1999 by the Bank Administration Institute and the 
Boston Consulting Group (BAI/BCG).
The first cost advantage that banks have over traditional 
independent life insurance sales agents is that their sales 
personnel, with fixed salaries, are less expensive than 
traditional brokers, who receive commissions (p. 22). This cost 
advantage is bolstered by economies of scope based on bank 
branch systems, customer information, administration, and 
trust. The first two economies of scope provide banks with 
advantages in the cost of selling insurance, the third provides 
advantages in the cost of underwriting, and customer trust 
serves to increase demand. For example, bank branches can 
provide space for life insurance activities as well as frequent 
opportunities for pursuing sales contacts. As a result, the 
productivity of bank personnel in selling life insurance can be 
relatively high. According to the BAI/BCG study, the sales 
productivity of a successful bancassurance agent can be three to 
five times higher than that of a traditional insurance agent 
(p. 23). Furthermore, banks can use their customer 
information to tailor their sales approach or to target products 
to individuals, which minimizes the chance of a wasted sales 
effort. Banks can also enjoy cost advantages in insurance 
underwriting by tapping their existing resources in areas such 
as administration, investment management, and human 
resources. Again, according to the study, it is not necessary for 
banks to add employees, systems, or other resources in order to 
generate and mail out premium notices. Instead, they can 
automatically debit payments from customers’ checking or 
savings accounts, which avoids bill generation and mailing as 
well as check processing (p. 9). Finally, banks can capitalize on 
the trust individuals typically have in their banks by extending 
their customer relationships to include insurance.
Successful Strategies
European banks have put substantial effort into entering the 
life insurance business during the past few decades and they 
have had substantial success. The BAI/BCG study estimates 
that leading European bancassurers typically generate a return 
Table 10
European Financial Institutions’ M&A Activity by Industry Segment,1990-99
Percent
Acquiring Institution








Commercial bank 51.1 6.8 5.0 0.0 0.2 63.2
Securities firm 2.4 6.7 0.8 0.2 0.0 10.2
Life insurance company 5.4 3.9 12.9 0.3 0.2 22.6
Property and casualty insurance company 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.3
Insurance brokerage 0.3 0.1 2.3 0.0 0.1 2.7
Total financial 59.2 17.7 21.5 1.0 0.5 100.0
Source: Securities Data Company.
Note: Figures are based on the sum of all target institutions’ market value of equity just before being acquired.50 The Changing Landscape of the Financial Services Industry
on sales and on capital of 20 percent to 30 percent and derive 
one-quarter to one-third of their retail profits from insurance 
and investment sales (p. 22). Moreover, European banks have 
penetrated the life insurance markets to a substantial degree: 
their share of the markets averages more than 20 percent, and 
exceeds 50 percent in France. Finally, European banks’ sales of 
life and pension insurance continue to grow at more than 
20 percent per year, substantially more rapidly than overall 
sales in their local markets.
Banks have actually transformed parts of the life insurance 
business in Europe. Historically, individuals with relatively 
high incomes or high net worth have purchased life insurance. 
Individuals with low or moderate incomes—who are 
traditional bank customers—have been “underinsured.” Thus, 
banks have access to a customer base, distinct from that of 
conventional independent insurance agents, that has 
substantial potential for fueling growth.
Banks have found that the ideal life insurance product for 
mass-market clients is much simpler than the products 
typically available through independent agents. Consequently, 
banks have tended to sell a limited range of life insurance 
products that are relatively simple to understand. Banks have 
also found that their customers prefer streamlined application 
and claims processes, and have developed such procedures. For 
example, the BAI/BCG study indicates that “in Europe, banks 
pursuing bancassurance strategies sell young customers simple 
life insurance policies valued up to $60,000 after only a fifteen-
minute interview at a branch, and no medical exam. By 
comparison, most big insurance companies require a medical 
exam and often take weeks to process a policy” (p. 2).
The European experience suggests that banks perform best 
in the life insurance business when they tightly integrate their 
banking operations with both insurance sales and insurance 
underwriting. Initially, when many banks entered marketing 
alliances with multiple insurance underwriters, these efforts 
met with mixed success. Even when successful, these ventures 
were generally not as profitable as more recent efforts with fully 
integrated production, perhaps because banks were not able to 
control the products they offered to ensure that they were 
appropriate for their client base.19 
A final pattern to note from the European experience 
concerns the entry of insurance firms into banking. 
Bancassurance, in which banks enter insurance, has generally 
had a larger presence in Europe than “assurebanking,” in which 
insurance firms enter banking.20 This asymmetry can be traced 
in part to the legal barriers that prevent nonbanks from 
entering banking in most EC countries (Hoschka 1994). It 
could also stem from the fact, noted earlier, that insurance has 
grown more robustly than banking in recent decades. 
Nonetheless, as our tables indicate, insurers now appear to be 
expanding into banking.
In sum, if the European experience is any guide, we could 
observe banks in the United States entering more aggressively 
into the life insurance business. This is consistent with both the 
event study evidence and the diversification benefits discussed 
earlier. Over time, it is possible that banks entering the life 
insurance business will integrate both sales and underwriting 
operations into their banking business, and that they may very 
well develop simpler life insurance policies and procedures 
appropriate for a mass market.
Conclusion
By allowing financial holding companies to own banks, 
securities underwriters, and insurance companies, Gramm-
Leach-Bliley sets the stage for another round of financial 
consolidation. Our evidence points most strongly to 
combinations of banks and life insurance companies. When 
the compromise on GLB was reached, the stock prices of banks, 
securities firms, and insurance companies all increased. 
Particularly sharp increases occurred at bank holding 
companies and securities firms that act as advisors in financial 
M&As as well as at life insurance companies. Moreover, our 
simulated mergers across the financial services industries 
indicate that the largest diversification benefits would result if 
bank holding companies combined with life insurance firms.
One explanation for the positive reaction of financial firms’ 
stock prices could be the recognition by shareholders that 
diversification benefits may allow these firms to expand into 
somewhat riskier activities or to operate with less capital. Our 
study also suggests, in contrast to earlier findings, that mergers 
between bank holding companies and either securities firms or 
property and casualty firms would likely raise BHC risk only 
modestly. Furthermore, the recent expansion of banks into the 
life insurance business in Europe, where few legal barriers to 
cross-industry activity have been in place, also supports the 
argument that banks are likely to acquire life insurance firms. Endnotes
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1. Concentration in local markets changed very little, however, 
suggesting that market power in banking has not increased (see 
Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan [1999]).
2. This calculation omits the ten largest banks from the comparison 
because these institutions are engaged in a very different set of 
activities than medium-size and small banks.
3. See Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise (1995) for year-by-year details on 
the changes in state laws.
4. Of course, deregulation is not strictly exogenous. The emergence of 
new technologies in both deposit taking and lending also may have 
encouraged deregulation (Kroszner and Strahan 1999). Another 
impetus may have been the rash of bank and thrift failures in the 
1980s, which increased awareness of the advantages of geographically 
diversified institutions (Kane 1996). 
5. The history of reform efforts on nonbank bank activity is compiled 
from work by Boyd and Graham (1986, 1988), Boyd, Graham, and 
Hewitt (1993), Ely and Robinson (1998, 1999), McGuire (1996), 
Mester (1996), and Thomas (1997).
6. For a discussion of the history and issues surrounding these 
firewalls, see Boyd and Graham (1986).
7. For a further explanation of the legislation and its meaning, see 
Barth, Brumbaugh, and Wilcox (2000).
8. Morgan (2000) argues that diversification across geographic and 
product lines within banking can help explain the large number of 
mergers over the past decade. 
9.  For a more comprehensive review of the research on these topics, 
see Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999), Kwan and Laderman (1999), 
and Santos (1998). 
10. In a subsequent study, Boyd, Graham, and Hewitt (1993) explore 
these same issues by allowing the portfolio weights for each bank-
nonbank pair to vary. Because their main conclusions were virtually 
identical to those of the earlier study, we focus on the earlier findings, 
which can be compared directly with our results.
11. A recent exception is the work of Laderman (2000). She found that 
over the 1987-97 period, risk is likely to be reduced when BHCs invest 
in life insurance, property and casualty insurance, and securities firms.  
Saunders and Walter (1994) simulated cross-industry mergers using 
daily stock return data over the 1984-88 period.  They concluded that 
risk reduction is most likely to occur from banks’ expansion into 
insurance, rather than into securities activities.  
12. Normality is a strong assumption for the distribution of rates of 
return. Nevertheless, Z is useful in providing a relative risk ranking 
across firms and industries. 
13. Although it might also be interesting to analyze mergers across 
medium-size and small firms, mergers across the largest firms would 
have the biggest effect on the financial services industries as a whole. 
For this reason, we focus our analysis on the largest firms. 
14. Note that with the exception of the 1996 Chase Manhattan-
Chemical merger, we did not construct pro-forma balance-sheet data 
for mergers prior to the time that they occurred. The pro-forma 
Chase-Chemical data are reported in the database, hence we use them 
in our study. When we recalculated our statistics—treating banks that 
merged during the period as a single bank throughout the entire 
period—we saw that the results were similar and our conclusions 
remained the same. 
15. We also examined mergers between the second largest BHCs and 
the top ten firms in the other industries. The results were similar to 
those reported in Table 8, although mergers with securities firms 
produced a Z-score of 34.17, somewhat lower than the 48.41 reported 
in the table. Securities firms in our sample typically are larger than this 
second group of BHCs, a factor that gives the risk of these firms greater 
weight in the calculation. 
16. In the Citigroup merger, the acquirer (Travelers) is categorized as 
an insurance company, even though about half of its business is in 
securities through its holdings of Salomon-Smith Barney.
17. We do not mean to imply that the regulation and supervision of 
these industries are identical across Europe; rather, with some 
variation in structure and practice, these activities typically are allowed 
to coexist. See Barth, Nolle, and Rice (1997) for a discussion of 
differences in bank structure and regulation across the European 
countries. 
18.  European banks’ return on equity declined from an average of 
roughly 13 percent in 1982 to less than 10 percent in 1991 (authors’ 
calculations, based on Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development [1993]).52 The Changing Landscape of the Financial Services Industry 
Endnotes (Continued)
19. For example, Credit Agricole of France began with a loose alliance 
with two insurance companies that lasted from the 1950s to the early 
1970s. Subsequently, it aligned more closely with a single firm, 
Soravie, but the firms could not agree on how to share profits. Finally, 
Credit Agricole established its own life insurance company in 1986; 
since then, business has grown at double-digit rates (Bank 
Administration Institute and Boston Consulting Group 1999, 
pp. 32-3).
20.  This asymmetry is not apparent in Tables 9 and 10 because the 
M&A statistics do not reflect de novo entry of banks into insurance.References
FRBNY Economic Policy Review / October 2000 53
Bank Administration Institute and Boston Consulting Group. 1999. 
“Putting It Together: Convergence Strategies for Banking, 
Insurance, and Investments.” 
Barth, J. R., D. Brumbaugh, and J. A. Wilcox. 2000. “The Repeal of 
Glass-Steagall and the Advent of Broad Banking.” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, May.
Barth, J. R., D. E. Nolle, and T. N. Rice. 1997. “Commercial Banking 
Structure, Regulation, and Performance: An International 
Comparison.” Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Working 
Paper no. 7. 
Berger, A. N., R. S. Demsetz, and P. E. Strahan. 1999. “The 
Consolidation of the Financial Services Industry: Causes, 
Consequences, and Implications for the Future.” Journal of 
Banking and Finance 23: 135-94.
Berger, A. N., A. K. Kashyap, and J. M. Scalise. 1995. “The 
Transformation of the U.S. Banking Industry: What a Long, 
Strange Trip It’s Been.” Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, no. 2: 55-218.
Bhargava, R., and D. R. Fraser. 1998. “On the Wealth and Risk Effects 
of Commercial Bank Expansion into Securities Underwriting: An 
Analysis of Section 20 Subsidiaries.” Journal of Banking and 
Finance 22: 447-65.
Bomfim, A. N., and W. R. Nelson. 1999. “Profits and Balance-Sheet 
Developments at U.S. Commercial Banks in 1998.” Federal 
Reserve Bulletin 85 (June): 369-95. 
Boyd, J. H., and M. Gertler. 1994. “Are Banks Dead? Or, Are the 
Reports Greatly Exaggerated?” In The Declining Role of 
Banking, 85-117. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Proceedings 
of the 30th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and 
Competition.
Boyd, J. H., and S. L. Graham. 1986. “Risk, Regulation, and Bank 
Holding Company Expansion into Nonbanking.” Federal Reserve 
Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 10, no. 2 (spring): 2-17.
———. 1988. “The Profitability and Risk Effects of Allowing Bank 
Holding Companies to Merge with Other Financial Firms: A 
Simulation Study.” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
Quarterly Review 12, no. 2 (spring): 3-20.
Boyd, J. H., S. L. Graham, and R. S. Hewitt. 1993. “Bank Holding 
Company Mergers with Nonbank Financial Firms: Effects on the 
Risk of Failure.” Journal of Banking and Finance 17: 43-63.
Ely, D. P., and K. J. Robinson. 1998. “How Might Financial Institutions 
React to Glass-Steagall Repeal? Evidence from the Stock Market.” 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Financial Industry Studies, 
September: 1-11.
———. 1999. “The Determinants of the Wealth Effects of Banks’ 
Expanded Securities Powers.” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 
Financial Industry Studies working paper, April. 
Esty, B. C., B. Narasimhan, and P. Tufano. 1999. “Interest-Rate 
Exposure and Bank Mergers.” Journal of Banking and 
Finance 23: 255-85.
Fazzari, S. M., R. G. Hubbard, and B. C. Petersen. 1988. “Financing 
Constraints and Corporate Investment.” Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, no. 1: 141-95.
Froot, K. A., and J. C. Stein. 1991. “Exchange Rates and Foreign Direct 
Investment: An Imperfect Capital Markets Approach.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 106: 1191-1218.
Gande, A., M. Puri, and A. Saunders. 1999. “Bank Entry, Competition, 
and the Market for Corporate Securities Underwriting.” Journal 
of Financial Economics 54, no. 2: 165-95.
Goldberg, L. G., G. A. Hanweck, M. Keenan, and A. Young. 1991. 
“Economics of Scale and Scope in the Securities Industry.” 
Journal of Banking and Finance 15: 91-107.
Gora, Jean C. 1997. “Bancassurance: Positioning for Affiliations. 
Lessons from Europe, Canada, and the United States.” Atlanta: Life 
Office Management Association.
Hoschka, T. 1994. Bancassurance in Europe. New York: 
St. Martin’s Press.
Hoshi, T., A. K. Kashyap, and D. Scharfstein. 1991. “Corporate 
Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese 
Industrial Groups.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 106: 
33-60.References (Continued)
54 The Changing Landscape of the Financial Services Industry 
Jayaratne, J., and P. E. Strahan. 1998. “Entry Restrictions, Industry 
Evolution, and Dynamic Efficiency: Evidence from Commercial 
Banking.” Journal of Law and Economics 49: 239-74.
Jensen, M. C. 1986. “Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate 
Finance, and Takeovers.” American Economic Review 76, no. 2: 
323-9. Papers and Proceedings of the 98th Annual Meeting of the 
American Economic Association.
Kane, E. J. 1996. “De Jure Interstate Banking: Why Only Now?” 
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 28, no. 2: 141-61.
Kaplan, S., and L. Zingales. 1997. “Do Investment-Cash Flow 
Sensitivities Provide Useful Measures of Financing Constraints?” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, no. 1: 169-215.
Kroszner, R. S., and P. E. Strahan. 1999. “What Drives Deregulation? 
Economics and Politics of the Relaxation of Bank Branching 
Restrictions.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, no. 4: 
1437-67.
Kwan, S. 1998. “Securities Activities by Commercial Banking Firms’ 
Section 20 Subsidiaries: Risk, Return, and Diversification 
Benefits.” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper 
no. 98-10. 
Kwan, S., and E. Laderman. 1999. “On the Portfolio Effects of 
Financial Convergence—A Review of the Literature.” Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Review 2: 18-31.
Kwast, M. 1989. “The Impact of Underwriting and Dealing on Bank 
Returns and Risk.” Journal of Banking and Finance 13: 
101-25. 
Laderman, E. 2000. “The Potential Diversification and Failure-
Reduction Benefits of Bank Expansion into Nonbanking 
Activities.” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper 
no. 2000-01. 
Lamont, O. 1996. “Cash Flow and Investment: Evidence from Internal 
Capital Markets.” Journal of Finance 52: 83-109.
Lang, G., and P. Welzel. 1998. “Technology and Cost Efficiency in 
Universal Banking: A Thick Frontier Approach.” Journal of 
Productivity Analysis 10: 63-84.
McGuire, Charles R. 1996. “Should Banks Sell Insurance? The 
Relationship of Section 92 of the Banking Act, the McFarran-
Ferguson Act, and State Laws Restricting Bank Activity.” Journal 
of Legislation 22.
Mester, Loretta J. 1996. “Repealing Glass-Steagall: The Past Points the 
Way to the Future.” Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
Business Review, July-August: 3-18.
Meyer, L. H. 1998. “Statement before the Committee on Banking and 
Financial Services.” U.S. House of Representatives, April 29.
Mishkin, F. S., and P. E. Strahan. 1999. “What Will Technology Do to 
the Financial Structure?” In Robert Litan and Anthony Santomero, 
eds., The Effect of Technology on the Financial Sector, 
249-87. Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services.
Moore, R. R., and T. F. Siems. 1998. “Bank Mergers: Creating Value or 
Destroying Competition?” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 
Financial Industry Issues, third quarter. 
Morgan, D. 2000. “The Benefits of Geographic Diversification by 
Banks.” Unpublished paper, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 1993. Bank 
Profitability Statistical Supplement; Financial 
Statements of Banks, 1982-91. Paris: Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development.
Radecki, L. J., J. Wenninger, and D. K. Orlow. 1997. “Industry 
Structure: Electronic Delivery’s Potential Effects on Retail 
Banking.” Journal of Retail Banking Services 19, no. 4: 57-63.
Santos, J. A. C. 1998. “Commercial Banks in the Securities Business: A 
Review.” Journal of Financial Services Research 14, no. 1: 
35-59.
Saunders, A., and I. Walter. 1994. Universal Banking in the 
United States. New York: Oxford University Press.
Thakor, A. V. 1999. “Information Technology and Financial Services 
Consolidation.” Journal of Banking and Finance 23: 697-700.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / October 2000 55
Thomas, Jeffrey H. 1997. “Barnett Bank Brings the Business of 
Insurance to the Attention of  Congress.” University of Arkansas
at Little Rock Law Journal, fall.
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York or the Federal Reserve System. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York provides no warranty, express or 
implied, as to the accuracy, timeliness, completeness, merchantability, or fitness for any particular purpose of any 
information contained in documents produced and provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in any form or 
manner whatsoever.